Postwar Modernity and the Wife's Subjectivity: Bernstein's Trouble in Tahiti by Keathley, Elizabeth & NC DOCKS at The University of North Carolina at Greensboro
Taste, Disgust, and Feminist Aesthetics 
By: Elizabeth Keathley 
Keathley, Elizabeth. “Taste, Disgust, and Feminist Theory,” Action, Criticism, Theory for Music 
Education Vol. 4, no. 1 (January 2006).  Available online:  
http://act.maydaygroup.org/articles/Keathley5_1.pdf  
Made available courtesy of the MayDay Group: http://act.maydaygroup.org/index.php  
 
***© The Author. Reprinted with permission. No further reproduction is authorized 
without written permission from the author.*** 
Abstract: 
The fourth volume in the Routledge series “Understanding Feminist Philosophy,” Carolyn 
Korsmeyer’s Gender and Aesthetics: An Introduction, aims to provide undergraduate philosophy 
students with some grounding in feminist aesthetics. The initial chapters provide a clear, 
although not unproblematical, summary of the ways gender is implicated in aesthetic theories of 
Western philosophy, how these implications bear on women’s artistic education and practice, 
and feminist critiques of Western aesthetics. The final chapters theorize beyond traditional 
aesthetics to contextualize the challenging art of the 20th and 21st centuries, especially certain 
types of feminist visual and performance art. Particularly noteworthy are Korsmeyer’s 
discussions of feminist artists’ use of the abject and disgust as an aesthetic response. While these 
are challenging issues, and Korsmeyer must be applauded for taking them on, they raise 
numerous questions that she fails to address, and sometimes even to acknowledge. Although 
Korsmeyer includes music in the earlier chapters, the later chapters deal almost exclusively with 
visual art, and this omission raises questions about whether music is compatible with more recent 
aesthetic theories. 
 Book Review | Feminism | Philosophy | Aesthetics | Musicology  Keywords:
***Note: Full text of article below 
Action, Criticism & Theory for Music Education
The refereed scholarly journal of the
Volume 5, No. 1
January 2006
Thomas A. Regelski, Editor
Wayne Bowman, Associate Editor
Darryl A. Coan, Publishing Editor
Electronic Article
Taste, Disgust, and Feminist Aesthetics
Elizabeth Keathley
© Elizabeth Keathley 2005 All rights reserved.
The content of this article is the sole responsibility of the author. The ACT Journal, the MayDay Group,
and Southern Illinois University Edwardsville are not liable for any legal actions that may arise involving
the article's content, including but not limited to, copyright infringement.
ISSN 1545-4517
This article is part of an issue of our online journal:
ACT Journal http://mas.siue.edu/ACT/
See the MayDay Group website at: http://www.maydaygroup.org
Action, Criticism & Theory for Music Education Electronic Article                       Page 2 of 13
______________________________________________________________________________________
Keathley, E. (2005). Taste, disgust, and feminist aesthetics. Action, Criticism, and Theory for Music Education.
Vol.5, #1 (January 2006). http:// act.maydaygroup.org/articles/Keathley5_1.pdf.
Taste, Disgust, and Feminist Aesthetics
Elizabeth Keathley, University of North Carolina at Greensboro
The fourth volume in the Routledge series “Understanding Feminist Philosophy,”
Carolyn Korsmeyer’s Gender and Aesthetics:  An Introduction, aims to provide undergraduate
philosophy students with some grounding in feminist aesthetics.  The initial chapters provide a
clear, although not unproblematical, summary of the ways gender is implicated in aesthetic
theories of Western philosophy, how these implications bear on women’s artistic education and
practice, and feminist critiques of Western aesthetics.  The final chapters theorize beyond
traditional aesthetics to contextualize the challenging art of the 20th and 21st centuries,
especially certain types of feminist visual and performance art.  Particularly noteworthy are
Korsmeyer’s discussions of feminist artists’ use of the abject and disgust as an aesthetic
response.  While these are challenging issues, and Korsmeyer must be applauded for taking them
on, they raise numerous questions that she fails to address, and sometimes even to acknowledge.
Although Korsmeyer includes music in the earlier chapters, the later chapters deal almost
exclusively with visual art, and this omission raises questions about whether music is compatible
with more recent aesthetic theories.
Placing into historical context the conceptual bases of Western beliefs about art, artists,
beauty, and aesthetics, Korsmeyer draws mostly upon 18th-century philosophers, most notably
Kant and Burke, although she places the origin of the concept of “fine arts” (and artists) closer to
the Early Modern period (Renaissance, to most music scholars), and reaches back to classical
Greece for such concepts as “genius.”  Much of this material, which repeatedly points up the
ways “the feminine” wound up on the devalued side of binary oppositions (fine art vs. craft;
reason vs. emotion; genius vs. muse, etc.) has been explicated in various works of feminist
musicology and ethnomusicology, and therefore is probably review for many readers of this
journal.1  But Korsmeyer’s presentation is unusually clear, and she does add some succinct
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insights and intriguing details.  For example, in explaining the separation of “fine art” from craft,
of purely aesthetic value from use value, Korsmeyer points out,
The notion of aesthetic value emerged from new approaches to pleasure and to the
receptivity and appreciation that were summed up in the idea of ‘taste.’ … As the notion
of fine art, in contrast with utilitarian arts, began to develop, more and more theorists
maintained that the true value of art is purely aesthetic, that art is for beauty and for the
aesthetic pleasure it furnishes.  Reinforcing these values, certain artistic institutions arose
in the modern period that provided venues for pure aesthetic enjoyment, most particularly
concert halls for listening to music and art museums where paintings were made available
to the public to appreciate the efforts of artists past and present, who were now conceived
to be persons who created for beauty and aesthetic insight (28).
Feminist art historians have commented on the gendering of the “art vs. craft” binary
since the 1970s, noting that “craft” is polluted by both its female associations and its utilitarian
dimensions.  But Korsmeyer goes further to suggest that the very notions of the aesthetic and of
taste developed in contradistinction to (typically) female practice, and that the institutions in
which women have so long sought equity were founded specifically to cultivate these elite
pleasures.  Thus, “structural sexism” in the arts reaches all the way back to fine art’s original
premises.2
These origins have considerable import for rethinking music education, for inequality is
built into structures of the things we teach, from playing concert music to its appreciation.  Can
the aesthetic be “refunctioned,” or is it only and always a privileged pleasure?  Can there really
be “art for all,” as some populist movements have suggested, or does that proposition always
suggest a diminution of art’s aesthetic value?3  Can we shunt the elitism inherent in “the
aesthetic” by teaching social contexts and use value along with “appreciation,” as some feminist
criticism has suggested, or do the origins of “the aesthetic” make it impervious to such
approaches?
A concept from feminist anthropology that would have helped Korsmeyer sort through
the various gendered binaries she addresses is the “nature/culture” dichotomy, articulated by
anthropologist Sherry Ortner in 1972.4  Ortner argues that virtually every human society either
implicitly or explicitly aligns women with nature and men with culture, an assumption that
undergirds not only the (purely aesthetic) art versus (utilitarian) craft opposition, but also
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explains why what men do is accorded more cultural value than what women do, even if what
they do are very similar things.  For example, everyday, utilitarian cooking is done most often by
women, but chefs of haute cuisine are more often men, a fact Korsmeyer does not consider in her
discussion of whether or not food can be classified as art (a subject to which I will return anon).
Clearly, many musical distinctions we discuss as educators and scholars, such as venue, genre,
texture, timbre and form, map easily onto the nature/culture divide, and are implicitly gendered
because of this mapping.
The nature/culture concept permits a more grounded discussion of gendered binaries that
can explain apparent discrepancies, as the following example illustrates.  Korsmeyer spends a
considerable portion of Chapter 1, on art and artists, explaining that, in our inherited conceptions
of art, rationality is a defining quality of an artist, and that women, with their putatively greater
emotionality, cannot satisfy this qualification.  But rationality—so crucial in the formulations of
Kant and others—was a dim second in the philosophy of the influential Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
who argued that passion rather than reason drove creativity.  Not incidentally, Rousseau believed
that men’s greater passion distinguished them from women, whose writing he found to be “a
hundred times more reasoned than impassioned.”5  Although an inversion of Kant’s gendering of
the intellect/emotion binary, Rousseau’s formulation yet preserves a duality in which women are
aligned with the devalued term.  Rousseau’s assessment of male and female creativity accords
with his other writings concerning gender, such as Émile (1762), which makes clear the domestic
obligations of women, implicitly linking them to the family, reproduction, and nature.
To offer an ethnomusicological example of this inversion of the reason/emotion binary,
Jane Sugarman has shown that Prespa Albanian men sing more ornately and with greater affect
than do women, marking emotion as both a male privilege and a source of musical creativity.
Again, it is woman’s reproductive role, her allegedly closer alignment with nature, that
“explains” these differences in creative ability.6  Thus, while the “rational man/emotional
woman” trope is certainly a dominant interpretation in Western culture, it is not universal.  The
nature/culture dyad provides a framework for understanding why, even when understandings of
male and female qualities are reversed in particular cultural or historical contexts, whichever
quality is more prized by a culture is attributed to men rather than to women.  Thus, there can be
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considerable difference in the construction of gender without any improvement in the status of
women as artists.
In my favorite chapter, “Deep Gender:  Taste and Food,” Korsmeyer elucidates the
gendered hierarchy of the five senses, and the implications this hierarchy has for what is
considered to be an acceptable topic for philosophical inquiry.  The supremacy of vision among
the senses, with its attendant implications of domination, has already been theorized by feminist
critics, but Korsmeyer calls on her own philosophical expertise—food—to show that smell and
taste are relatively devalued senses because “they don’t seem to be required in the developments
of higher types of knowledge” (87).7  Moreover, unlike vision and hearing, which operate at a
distance, smell and taste work within closer ranges, emphasizing their alignment with the
“animal” or “bodily” senses.  Touch lies somewhere between these two poles, as it is at once
bodily and close range, but also an important means of verifying truths that may elude hearing
and vision, and therefore plays an important cognitive function.  To demonstrate the gender
significance of this sense hierarchy, Korsmeyer calls on the mind/body binary from earlier
chapters as well as the associations of smell and taste with eating and drinking and therefore
nurturance and domesticity, and the conventional assessment that smell and taste are private and
subjective pleasures, sensual rather than aesthetic, and therefore inappropriate subjects for
aesthetic judgment.  (Again, the differences Korsmeyer takes care to explain map easily onto the
nature/culture dyad.)
Defending the aesthetic importance of food and the sense of taste, Korsmeyer considers
whether cooking qualifies as art.  More than a merely personal pleasure, she argues, food is
invested with meaning through symbolic shapes and tastes and ceremonial and social uses, and
fine food manifests qualities objective enough to be discussed among educated experts.  But, she
concludes, “food simply does not qualify as a fine-art form in any recognizable sense,” because
fine arts emphasize “the autonomy of art and the contemplative distance between audience and
artwork” (99).  Food and its preparation, she argues, have certain qualities that are not “favored
by traditional concepts of fine art,” including the repetitiveness of cooking and food’s instability
of physical form.  Food and cooking, her arguments suggest, do not conform to the “work”
concept of art.  But then, neither does musical performance.
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This parallel bears reflection:  “art music” seems to take its ontological status from the
score—a physically stable form, “settled” by publication and visually apprehended—rather than
from sounding music, which is aurally apprehended and the actual source of aesthetic enjoyment.
Musical performance not secured by the careful rendering of a score holds a relatively low status
in classical music institutions, and musicians, who, like cooks, perform repetitive actions,
creating anew each time the pleasure to be consumed, do not enjoy the same prestige as the
composers who create the physical, visual score.  Thus, as in Korsmeyer’s sense hierarchy,
vision trumps hearing, even in music, and by comparison to certain aspects of food and cooking,
music does not qualify as an object of aesthetic contemplation.  But historically that was not true:
in the 19th century, music was the most highly regarded of the arts and its putative material
insubstantiality was part of the reason.  Thus, it seems that the guardians of fine art use other
criteria to include some arts and exclude others.  Korsmeyer is content to let the categories of
fine art stand, but concludes this section with the statement that food “has aesthetic importance in
its own right and need not borrow status from art” (100).
An aspect Korsmeyer does not consider here is the possibility that the limits of scent and
smell may not have been tested to the extent that “higher” senses have, and the lack of interest in
exploring them may be due to their gender associations.  She quotes the aesthetician Frank
Sibley’s assessment that, “perfumes and flavors…are necessarily limited:  unlike the major arts,
they have no expressive connections with emotions, love or hate, grief, joy, terror, suffering,
yearning, pity, or sorrow—or with plot or character development.”8  But anyone who has been in
the “aroma therapy” department of their local health food megastore knows that a multitude of
claims are now being made for scent, including many pertaining to emotion.  Moreover, a well-
known brand of air freshener now markets aroma with narrative content:  “Scent Stories” allows
its consumer to select a sequence of scents that changes over some limited span of time.  Leave it
to capitalism to plumb the depths unreachable by philosophical inquiry.
When I was a child in the 1960s, I was excited by some talk about “smellevision” and
disappointed that it never came to pass (my closest experience was attending a movie about
Cajun culture at the Fox Venice [California] Theater, where the smells of cooking Cajun food
wafted from the kitchen as the film played).  Was the talk of smellevision just a cruel hoax?  Was
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it impracticable because smell lacks the distance properties of hearing and vision?  Or was the
idea merely dropped because smell was too trivial a sense to pursue?  While the examples above
may not be aesthetic applications of scent, they do suggest that the premises by which scent has
been judged “unaesthetic” are not entirely accurate, and that, as Korsmeyer argues, its
devaluation in the sense hierarchy is ideological and gender-based.
Korsmeyer contextualizes feminist visual art within contemporary art and its theories,
and these chapters raise the most vexing questions.  Arguing for the importance of defining what
constitutes art, she opines that, without a way to include and exclude potential members of this
category, there would no adequate “response to the puzzles that the artworld amply delivers to us
nowadays” (112), and that the ambiguities inherent in much contemporary—especially
feminist—art “cannot be resolved without the context that theoretical aesthetics provides for the
practice of art” (152).  The argument itself, although not its values, reminds me of Tom Wolfe’s
critique, The Painted Word, which maintains that modern art is not meaningful to the public
beyond experts’ verbal explanations for it.9  Because much feminist art challenges traditional
aesthetics as well as gender-based social oppression, and because it often situates itself in
relation to historical precedents, much feminist art demands theorizing (and theorists),
Korsmeyer suggests.
Supporting her arguments are the “institutional theory,” American philosopher George
Dickie’s attempt to define art, and the opinion of art critic Arthur Danto that nowadays art is
about meaning rather than aesthetic responses, and that perceiving art as art demands “an
atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art” (115).  Although Korsmeyer is
clearly sensitive to the burdens of history, noting that the concepts of art and artist and their
imputation of masculinity have not changed radically despite radical changes in feminist and
post-modern art (128), she also opines that “the institutional theory… is not overtly
exclusionary” (115).  Overtly, maybe not, but as one of the primary texts of feminist musicology,
Marcia Citron’s Gender and the Musical Canon, demonstrates, institutions, the opinions of those
who make policy at institutions, and women’s limited access to many institutions, have been
critical aspects of the omission of women’s works from the musical canon.  A theory that trusts
institutions to define what counts as art is not one I expect to embrace any time soon.
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Korsmeyer makes distinctions between philosophical definitions of art and standards of
evaluation, and this strikes me as ivory towerism of the most naïve sort, as these excerpts show:
We do not find with contemporary philosophical concepts of art and of the artist the same
kinds of exclusionary categories that prevailed as the fine-art tradition developed.  (This
is not to say that the standards of evaluation and selection in the artworld today have
erased all of the skewed value structures that excluded women’s accomplishments of the
past.  That is a matter for a study of the critical reception of art, which I have not done
here) (128).
And a little further:
It is ironic that although the value distinctions associated with mind and body are still
pretty well entrenched—for habits of abstract evaluation seem hard to break—the
metaphysics that used to subtend them is no longer in place.  The gendered values that
traditional concepts assumed in philosophy of the past apparently fade less speedily than
the explicit philosophical tenets adopted at any given period (133).
Even conceding that the academic field of philosophy is less tradition-bound than the
field I know best (musicology), I would be very surprised to learn that philosophy as a discipline
has shaken off its Enlightenment past and completely jettisoned the mind/body duality.  Further,
if there is only one operational philosophical trend at any one moment—as the second excerpt
implies—then philosophy is distinct among all other disciplines.  Finally, like musicology and
many other disciplines, philosophy has a limited influence on what people believe, but common
cultural beliefs have a great deal of influence on philosophers.  Philosophy doesn’t prescribe
gendered values or anything else, but rather explains what already exists, in this realm or
another.  As an academic discipline, philosophy has been affected by intellectual feminism, but
most of the world still lives by its gut, without reflection or self-examination, and its knee-jerk
evaluations are rehearsed ad nauseum in popular culture, especially advertising, every day.  It is
hardly surprising and certainly not ironic that philosophy should have made some advances over
the culture at large, but it remains to be seen what feminist aesthetic philosophy can contribute to
the institutional, critical, and popular understandings of feminist art.
The most challenging and fascinating discussions of this book revolve around feminist
artworks that confront traditional aesthetics by using materials coded feminine, such as fiber,
food, and the (female) artist’s body, engaging disgust, which Korsmeyer argues as a parallel to
the sublime.  (She uses the theories of Julia Kristeva and Luce Irigaray to introduce the concept
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of the abject, which can arouse disgust, but this line of inquiry seems peripheral to her primary
argument.)  The sublime, as she has already shown in earlier chapters, was theorized by
Enlightenment philosophers as a “masculine” aesthetic quality counterposed to the feminine
“beautiful,” which elicited transcendent feelings of awe or terror.  An oversimplified music
analogy from 19th-century music discourse is the putatively sublime music of Beethoven, so
characterized due to its scale and presumed content, vis-à-vis the beauty of Mozart’s.  The
perception of rough-hewn and mighty mountains, wild and threatening nature, near-death
experiences, or a glimpse of the Almighty were regarded as sublime, beyond human
comprehension, and therefore transformative.  Intrinsic to the experience was the perceiver’s
ability to exert mastery over the sublime object by surmounting the fear it elicits, and thereby
realizing that human thought is unbounded by nature (133-34).  In opposition to this sublime of
mastery and domination, Korsmeyer cites Barbara Freeman’s concept of the “feminine sublime,”
a domain of experience “in which the subject enters into relation with an otherness…that is
excessive and unrepresentable” (136).10  Rather than exert domination, the feminine sublime
“accepts its relation with other forces and a certain loss of individuation” (136).  While accepting
otherness rather than dominating it certainly has appealing aspects, especially with respect to
nature, the alignment of masculinity with mastery and femininity with acceptance is
problematical for reasons that are probably obvious to readers of this journal.
Because it is visceral, overwhelming, and “unrepresentable”—in the sense that it is not
seemly to represent it—the disgusting parallels the sublime, according to Korsmeyer.  The
“emotion of disgust [can be] aroused by art as part of understanding and appreciation,” she
argues, where disgust can be a part of realizing the transgressive and imaginative aspects of the
artistic representation (144).  Disgust and the abject can, indeed, lead to reflection on substantive
philosophical issues, such as mortality.  Many of Korsmeyer’s examples involve women’s
bodies, functions, and fluids, such as Joanna Frueh’s tale of a girl who tastes her own menstrual
blood, the staged and sometimes horrifying self-portraits of Cindy Sherman, and Hannah Wilke’s
parodies of classic nudes using her own cancer-ridden and obviously ill body.  The political and
artistic fearlessness of these women is awesome in the non-trivial sense, and they do indeed
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provoke thought:  Korsmeyer makes a compelling case for these feminist artists and their use of
disgust.
Since Korsmeyer demurs on the issue of reception, however, she does not address the
Realpolitik of gender in this art other than to comment that, “The evocation of the powerful
aversion of disgust is a daring artistic enterprise, for it risks both alienation of audiences and
misinterpretation of intent and meaning” (150).  She glides past the relationship of disgust and
pornography, but this warrants much more discussion, for disgust is very much a part of
pornography’s aesthetic appeal.  I’m not talking about the airbrushed classic aestheticism of
bourgeois soft-core magazines like Playboy, but rather the magazines, films and websites that
cater to particular erotic tastes, like children, very fat people, amputees, bestiality, etc., in all
their gross materiality.  Their representation of “warm, dark sticky interior[s] where
unmentionable substances are kept hidden away” (146), the celebration of un-beautiful female
bodies, the free flow of fluids of all kinds, and fascination with the abject (which Freud
associated with childbirth, but also with defecation) exceed the transgressive qualities of any
feminist art I have viewed.  So it really does come down to “intent and meaning,” but who
controls meaning?
As Korsmeyer makes clear in her discussion of how Dada became ART, “the power of
history trumps individual intent” (114).  And since history burdens the female body with
tenacious meanings, the prospect of an artist using her own body to demystify or reinterpret
femaleness seems grim.  With the amount of exposure women’s bodies receive in contemporary
culture, you would think there are no mysteries left, yet women’s bodies as symbols of male
visual delectation, sexual pleasure, reproduction and nurture do not seem even vaguely shaken.
Moreover, in our post-modern “death of the author” climate, is meaning any longer the purview
of the woman artist?  I suggest that, for better or for worse, it is not under the artist’s control, and
that in the absence of an unequivocal message—which many would say puts it beyond the realm
of art into the category of “agit-prop”—the artist’s intent is very likely to be subverted to
conform to historical interpretations.11  All of this is not to say that feminist artists should not
use their bodies or evoke disgust, but rather that, even in an introduction, the complexity of these
issues demands more context, more consideration of implications for women’s relation to
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culture, and more acknowledgment of related phenomena, such as pornography, the grotesque,
and camp.  (Anyone unfamiliar with disgust should see John Waters’ film Pink Flamingos.)
Korsmeyer does not discuss how feminist strategies of using devalued artistic materials,
artists’ bodies, and the evocation of disgust do or could work in music, but it is worth
considering.  Susan McClary has discussed the performance artist Laurie Anderson, who does
use her body, but not in a markedly sexual, and certainly not a disgusting way, and Diamanda
Galás, whose performances of Plague Mass do evoke the type of disgust and provoke the
reflective response Korsmeyer speaks of here.  But these musicians are seldom regarded as
musicians, much less composers, but rather as performance artists, some type of half-breed only
grudgingly accepted into discussions of music history.  Women musicians more solidly within
popular music traditions, for example Tori Amos and P.J. Harvey, have written and sung
disruptive lyrics, foregrounded their bodies in performance, and used certain aspects of disgust,
as when Amos posed suckling a pig.12  Punk rock feminists and rappers like Li’l Kim operate
outside female music traditions by virtue of their masculine genres, their unbeautiful aural
presentations, and use of “dirty” and sexuality explicit words.  But none of these artists has made
much impact on how we think about and teach music—certainly not the way feminists like
Karen Finley and Cindy Sherman have shaken the institutions of art—in part because a gulf
remains between popular and classical music.
The institutions of classical music, still largely bound up in 19th-century ideas of
transcendence, reject embodiment as a feature of music, although in practice sexiness is a
common music marketing tool.  Such body hypocrisy would seem to demand intervention, but it
is not clear whether it is possible to use visual art’s methods to challenge gendered concepts of
music because, as with Laurie Anderson and Diamanda Galás, acknowledging the body shunts
the artist into a different, ostensibly inferior aesthetic category.
Finally, Korsmeyer’s attention to critiquing binaries does not, as one might expect, lead
her to question the binary division of gender.  “Gender and Aesthetics” ultimately means
“Women and aesthetics,” and although that is a legitimate topic, to equate women with
gender—as though men do not have gender, and as though there are no other available
genders—is obviously problematical.  Regardless of its shortcomings, I found Gender and
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Aesthetics to be interesting, thought provoking, and appropriate for its intended audience. These
issues warrant much discussion, particularly in music, which always seems behind the curve.
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Public Radio, 9 October 2005).
12  For analyses of songs by Amos, Harvey, and others, see Lori Burns and Melisse Lafrance,
Disruptive Divas:  Feminism, Identity, and Popular Music (New York:  Routledge, 2002).
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